Abstract-Energy storage units (ESUs) including EVs and home batteries enable several attractive features of the modern smart grids such as effective demand response and reduced electric bills. However, uncoordinated charging of ESUs stresses the power system. In this paper, we propose privacy-preserving and collusion-resistant charging coordination centralized and decentralized schemes for the smart grid. The centralized scheme is used in case of robust communication infrastructure that connects the ESUs to the utility, while the decentralized scheme is useful in case of infrastructure not available or costly. In the centralized scheme, each energy storage unit should acquire anonymous tokens from a charging controller (CC) to send multiple charging requests to the CC via the aggregator. CC can use the charging requests to enough data to run the charging coordination scheme, but it cannot link the data to particular ESUs or reveal any private information. Our centralized scheme uses a modified knapsack problem formulation technique to maximize the amount of power delivered to the ESUs before the charging requests expire without exceeding the available maximum charging capacity. In the decentralized scheme, several ESUs run the scheme in a distributed way with no need to aggregator or CC. One ESU is selected as a head node that should decrypt the ciphertext of the aggregated messages of the ESUs' messages and broadcast it to the community while not revealing the ESUs' individual charging demands. Then, ESUs can coordinate charging requests based on the aggregated charging demand while not exceeding the maximum charging capacity. Extensive experiments and simulations are conducted to demonstrate that our schemes are efficient and secure against various attacks, and can preserve ESU owner's privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy storage units (ESUs), including both home batteries and electric vehicles (EVs), present an effective solution to improve the functionalities of the aging power grid. Typically, ESUs represent a powerful emergency backup that can be used during electricity outage events, which in turn enhances the power grid resilience [1] . Moreover, ESUs provides an approach to overcome the intermittent nature of renewable energy sources, which allows for a high integration level of eco-friendly energy sources. Consequently, ESUs offer environmental benefits as well by reducing greenhouse gas emissions [2] . Besides, the stored energy in such units can be used during peak load periods, which in turn reduces the stress on the power grid during these periods, and hence, enables effective demand response. Moreover, ESUs offer economic benefits by reducing the customers' electricity bills since the ESU owners can purchase energy from the grid in low tariff periods and then use it during high tariff periods.
In fact, despite their several benefits, ESUs pose several challenges that should be addressed for efficient integration in the power grid. In specific, simultaneous uncoordinated charging of ESUs may result in a lack of balance between the charging demands and the energy supply resulting in instability of the overall resilience of the grid [3] . In severe cases, this could lead to a mass blackout. For example, usually after work, most of the electric vehicles (EVs) owners will go back home and plug their EVs to charge. To mitigate such consequences, there is a substantial need for a charging coordination mechanism to avoid stressing the distribution system and prevent power outage [4] . Typically, in a charging coordination mechanism, ESUs needs to report data such as the time-to-complete-charging (TCC), the battery state-ofcharge (SoC), and the amount of required charging. Then, a charging controller (CC) can define ESUs with highest priorities to charge first and defer others to another time slot [1] . Unfortunately, this data can reveal private information about the ESUs' owner such as the location of an ESU, when an ESU owner returns home, the activities of a house's dwellers, etc.
While one can design solutions for specifically securing the communications and hiding the information from the involved parties, this may adversely affect the performance of the charging coordination itself. This is because privacy preservation usually aims to hide information, while the charging coordination schemes need enough data. To the best of our' knowledge, many schemes were presented in the literature to deal with coordinated ESUs charging issues [2] , [5] , [6] , but they do not take the privacy issue into consideration. To tackle that issue, our previous works deal specifically with the charging coordination privacy issues [1] , [7] . In [1] , we presented a privacy-preserving power charging coordination scheme based on reshuffling the identifiers of ESUs by the aggregator. Then, an anonymous decision is taken by the CC using encryption and symmetric keys sharing techniques. However, if both the CC colludes with the aggregator, it can reveal all the ESUs, personal information. In [7] , we proposed adding noise to charging requests so the CC can not link whether two charging requests are from the same ESU or not. However, adding high levels of noise to the information reports may lead to underutilization of available charging power due to the addition of noise (i.e., some ESUs request more charging than what they need). Additionally, existing on schemes do not consider privacy concerns in charging coordination among ESUs where there is no infrastructure such as the CC aggregators (e.g., micro-grids [8] ).
In this paper, we propose two collusion-resistant, privacypreserving and efficient charging coordination schemes, a centralized and a decentralized. In the centralized scheme, each ESU sends a charging request to an aggregator which in turns forwards this request to the CC. To tackle collusion attacks in [7] , [9] , we use partial blind signature to generate tokens for ESUs. Tokens can be used to annomously authenticate ESUs without exposing the real identities of ESUs. Then, since the CC can link charging requests to the same ESU since ESUs send requests with TTC and SoC which can be slightly changed in consecutive time slots. To mitigate this problem, instead of sending one request, an ESU should split their charging needs into several random generated requests. In this way, linking a charging request to a specific ESU becomes difficult; however, allowing the ESU to charge before the TCC expires.
To address the shortcoming of existing works in a privacypreserving decentralized charging coordination where a reliable communication infrastructure to connect the ESUs to the CC is not available, not needed as in the case of a microgrid, or it is costly. In this scheme, one node (or more than one) among several ESUs is selected as a head node. Each ESU then should add a secret mask to their charging requests, encrypt them using homomorphic encryption, and send them to the head node. This node then aggregates all the ciphertexts received, and then the total charging needs of the community of ESUs can be obtained. The head node then communicates this total charging demand to the ESUs, and if the needs are greater than the total charging capacity, the ESUs should adjust their charging demands so that the total energy demand is equal to maximum charging capacity. This adjustment is done so that most of the reduction is done by the ESUs that have low priority, i.e., their SoC and TCC are large.
Our main contributions and the challenges the paper aims to address can be summarized as follows.
• A privacy-preserving centralized charging coordination scheme is proposed. Collusion between the CC and the aggregator is mitigated using anonymous tokens obtained by each ESU. Moreover, CC can not link whether two charging requests in different time-slots are from the same ESU or not.
• A privacy-preserving decentralized scheme is proposed.
The scheme resists to collusion attacks among ESUs by masking the ESUs' requests and removing the masks by aggregating the requests using homomorphic encryption so that no one can learn the charging requests of the individual ESUs.
• Further simulations, analysis, and practical experiments are conducted to evaluate the proposed schemes and also the performance of the charging coordination comparing to the first-come-first-serve (FCFS) strategy. The results indicate that our schemes can coordinate charges efficiently while preserving privacy and mitigating collusion attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the network and threat models, followed by the design goal of our schemes in Section II. In Section III, we discuss preliminaries used by this research work. Then, the centralized and decentralized scheme are presented in Section IV and V respectively. Section VI discuss the charging coordination in our schemes. Detailed security and privacy analysis are provided in Section VII. Section VIII presents the related works. Finally, we give concluding remarks in Section IX followed by acknowledgement in Section. X
II. NETWORK AND THREAT MODELS
In this section, we present the considered network model followed by the adversary and threat models, and then, we introduce the design goals of our scheme.
A. Network Models
As illustrated in Fig. 1a , the centralized considered network model has a number of communities and a charging controller (CC). Each community can be one neighborhood or all the loads connected to the same electric bus. It has a group of energy storage units (ESUs) and one aggregator. The storage units can be PEVs or batteries installed in homes. The aggregator and the CC can communicate via WIMAX or 4G. The communication between the ESUs and the aggregator is assumed to be wireless using either WiFi or LTE [10] . The CC cannot communicate with the storage units directly, but this has to be done via the aggregators. The ESUs send charging requests to the aggregator to forward them to the CC. The CC prepares charging schedules and send them back to the ESUs.
As shown in Fig. 1b , the decentralized scheme only has ESUs can communicate with the other ESUs either directly sing wireless communication, WiFi or LTE/5G or using multihops data transmission relying on secure and privacy preserving mechanisms such as [11] . ESUs can play different role. One ESU acts as a head ESU and this ESU can change in each time slot. The head ESU should receive charging requests from the other ESUs, aggregate and decrypt them, and finally broadcast them aggregated message. Multiple ESUs can act as head ESU at the same time. Some ESUs can act as routers to relay other ESUs messages. Some ESUs can inject power to the grid while others need to charge. And the total charging capacity can be obtained by aggregating the amount of power that can be injected by the ESUs.
B. Threat Model
For the threat model, in both centralized and decentralized schemes, an honest-but-curious model is considered, which assumes that the attackers do not aim to disturb the proper operation of the scheme, yet they are just interested in gathering private information about other ESUs such as whether they need to charge or not as well as their charging demands.
The attackers in the centralized scheme can be the aggregator, the CC, ESUs, and eavesdroppers and may passively snoop on the communications to learn sensitive information but should not learn whether an ESU needs to charge or not, nor learn about the charging request data such as TCC and SoC. We consider a collusion attack between internal attackers (aggregator and CC) to identify the user and link the charging requests to a specific identity. We consider a collusion attack between internal attackers (aggregator and CC) to identify the user and link the charging requests to a specific identity. The CC can launch a linkability attack using the SoC and TCC of charging requests to infer ESU's sensitive information.
In the decentralized scheme, the attackers can be external eavesdroppers that eavesdrop on the communications of the ESUs and try to figure out some information, and can also be ESUs including the head ESU, and can work individually or they can collude to launch stronger attacks. Since the requests are aggregated, linkability is not considered. The collusion attack on the other and is considered between malicious ESUs and the head node ESU.
C. Design Goals
The following objectives for the centralized/decentralized charging coordination schemes should be met:
• Privacy-Preserving charging activities. In case of centralized scheme, the CC can know the TCC and SoC of an ESU to run the charging coordination scheme yet the information should be anonymized to preserve ESUs owners' privacy. Also, in case of the decentralized scheme, no single ESU should know the charging information of other ESUs.
• Unlinkability. The success probability of linkability attacks based on SoC, TCC, or the combination of both, as seen in the centralized scheme, should be mitigated.
• Resist to Collusion attacks. Both schemes should provide solutions to mitigate collusion attacks that violate the privacy of ESU owners.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Several cryptographic tools are used in the centralized and decentralized schemes in order to secure the scheme and preserve privacy. These tools are briefly explained below. Notations are given in Table. I. 
Individual n charging requests of the request R
A. Bilinear Pairing
Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group with generator P and order of prime q, and G 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order q. Let e: G 1 x G 1 → G 2 be a Bilinear Map with these properties: 1) Bilinearity: e(aP , bQ) = e(P, Q) ab for all P, Q ∈ G 1 , and a, b ∈ Z q . 2) Non-degeneracy: There exists P, Q ∈ G 1 such that e(P, Q) = 1. 3) Computability: There is an efficient algorithm allowing to compute e(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G 1 .
B. Partial Blind Signature
Blind Signature is a cryptographic scheme in which the sender of a message is able to get the signature on this message from the singing party while concealing the content of the message. Partial Blind Signature (PBS) is a special case of Blind Signature where the signer can include in the signed message information that is known to both singer and sender, such as a time or date [12] . PBS has been extensively used in the anonymization of electronic coins, and were introduced by [13] An example of PBS is explained in the following steps.
1) The signer picks a random element x ∈ R Z * q and computes P pub = xP , P ∈ G 1 , where x is the private key and P pub is the corresponding public key 2) The requester randomly chooses a number r ∈ R Z * q and computes U = H 0 (m||c) + r(H(c)P + P pub ) and sends Finally, the requester can use m σ to authenticate him self anonymously and the signer can accept the signature by checking:
e(H(c)P + P pub , σ) ? = e(P, H 0 (m||c))
C. Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption using the Pailler cryptosystem [14] , [15] has been widely adopted. The Paillier cryptosystem is a public key cryptography in which additive operations can be performed on the ciphertext, in such a way that the resulting decryption of the new ciphertext yields the summation of the plaintext messages. For example given ciphertexts E(m 1 ) and E(m 2 ) for plaintext messages m 1 and m 2 , the decryption operation using
. We refer the reader to [14] for further details.
IV. PROPOSED CENTRALIZED SCHEME

A. Motivation
In the centralized scheme mode of communication, the CC should have access to SoC and TCC of a given ESU to perform the charging schedules among ESUs. However, since the CC has this information over several times slots for all the ESUs, the CC could monitor requests over time slots and infer that charging requests are sent from the same ESU, which would violate the privacy of ESU owners. This is attack is known as a linkability Attack. Typically, a linkability attack succeed when an ESU is not scheduled for charging in a time slot, it has to send a new charging request in the next time slot so that the difference between SoC and TCC of the two time slots' requests is not small. To be specific, a TCC within a new charging request should be reduced by one time slot and SoC should be reduced by the power consumed during the time slot.
To evaluate the success of charging linkability attacks, Matlab was used to run the experiments and the values of TCC and SoC were selected randomly based on the uniform distribution from {1, · · · , 48} in time slots units, and [1, 50] kW, respectively. In the first experiment, SoC takes integer values of {1, · · · , 50} in kW units, and in the second experiment, the resolution of SoC was increased, allowing a single decimal place, thus taking larger set of values (i.e., {1.0, · · · , 50} in kW units). In each attack, 100 runs were performed and the average is presented in the experiment results. In addition, a total of 150 ESUs were used in the simulation, each ESU submitted a single charging request, and the maximum charging capacity was 1000kW. To convert SoC to amount of power needed, the formula (1 − S vi ) × M ax Cap is used, where M ax Cap is the maximum capacity of the battery, which is assumed to be 100kW. Also, we considered Several attacks as follows. As shown in Fig. 2a , for a low resolution of SoC, charging request linkability attack can experience considerable levels of success, especially when the number of ESUs submitting requests is small. For instance, the average probability of success is above 0.75, 0.65, and 0.95 for Attack 1, Attack 2 and Attack 3, respectively in case of 20 ESUs. The probability of success for the linkability attack reaches 0.2 in the case of Attack 1 when the number of ESUs increases to 140, or below 0.2 in the case of Attack 2, however, when the combination of SoC and TCC is used in Attack 3, the likelihood of success is considerably higher, reaching values of over 0.80. This is because as more ESUs submit requests, the likelihood of
Exchanged messages in centralized scheme similarity among requests increases, which explains the drop in the success rate of linkability attacks as the number of ESUs increases. Also, for SoC with greater resolution (i.e., a larger set of possible values for SoC), it can be seen that as in Fig 2b that the success rate of the attacks increases considerably comparing to Fig. 2a when SoC is used, as shown in Attacks 1 and 3. This improvement is especially noticeable in Attack 3, where the success probability reaches 0.97 even with high number of ESUs as 140. In the case of Attack 2, the success probability is not affected significantly comparing to Fig. 2a . This behavior is attributed to the shorter range of values of TCC as opposed to those of SoC that is considerably larger. With a larger set of possible values for SoC, it becomes easier to single out distinct pairs of requests. This contributed to the increased level of success of the likability attack, either when SoC was used by itself, or in combination with TCC. It can be concluded that: 1) From Fig. 2 that Attack 1 is always more successful than Attack 2, because SoC has a larger range of values than TCC. This makes it easier for the CC to distinguish unique requests as there is more range of values each request can take. Also, Attack 3 is always more successful than Attacks 1 and 2 since Attack 3 can benefit from the range of values of SoC, and the additional information of TCC can contribute to the success of the attack.
2) The results of these experiments demonstrate that the number of requests submitted from a community would need to be sufficiently large in order to make data linkability attack unsuccessful. Motivated by the above results, in the next sections, we discuss in details our privacy-preserving and collusion-resistant scheme for a centralized mode of communication.
B. Acquisition of Tokens
In this phase, each ESU should acquire a number of cryptographic tokens from the CC. These tokens are used to anonymously authenticate the ESU and also help it to share a key with the CC to encrypt the charging schedules. Acquisition of tokens is illustrated in Fig. 3 . First, let an ESU v i that need to acquire m tokens, for each token τ vi , where 1 ≤ ≤ m, it should send msg 1 to the CC. msg 1 contains a blinded portion of the message that is:
vi→cc is a key encrypted by the public key of the CC (P K cc ), (T E) is the expiry time of the token request, and P K
vi is a public key that corresponds to private key SK ( ) vi is known only to v i . The blinded part can help the ESU to share a key with the CC but it cannot authenticate the ESUs to the CC or the aggregator. This is solved by the generation of private/public key pairs by the ESU, and adding public key P K ( ) vi to the blinded portion of the message. To authenticate, the ESU should sign using the private key SK ( ) vi corresponding to public key P K ( ) vi . Also, msg 1 contains besides the blinded part, the real ID of the v i (ID vi ), a timestamp (T S), and the signature of the v i on the message σ vi . Note that the use of a time-stamp as part of the unblinded portion of the request can protect against packet replay attack.
Then, once the CC receives msg 1 from the ESU, it verifies the legitimacy and authenticity of the request by verifying the signature provided in σ vi . In addition, it checks that the request's timestamp (T S) matches the current time. If all the verifications succeed, the CC signs the request and sends a partially-blind-signature msg 2 back to the ESU as follows .
The token's expiry date (T E) is added to the signature to guarantee that each token has a validity period. If any of the previous checks fails, the request for partial blind signature is denied. Note that an ESU can obtain a number of tokens that can be used for a period of time (e.g., a week).
C. Charging Requests Submission
As discussed previously in Section. IV-A, the likelihood of success of the linkability attack decreases when the number of requests increases, and in our scheme, each ESU should send n requests, as opposed to a single request. In this subsection, we discuss how an ESU sends their charging requests to the CC anonymously while mitigating linkability attacks. 1) Computing Charging Request's: In a centralized scheme, two main elements play key role in a charging coordination namely T CC and SoC, following [1] , this priority of each ESU can be computed as follows.
Where F (T v ) is a decreasing function of T v with a range of [0, 1] and F (T v ) = 0 for long TCC and equals 1 for short TCC, and SoC value (S v ) ∈ [0, 1) with S v = 1 for a completely charged ESU.
Our strategy to mitigate linkablity attacks is described as follows. For a charging request denoted as R vi , it computes n random priorities {U
, it calculates random tuples of S (j,k) vi and T (j,k) vi that can achieve the priority U (j,k) vi using Eq. 2. Note that SoC and TCC for each request is computed at random so
is used to generate the priority for each individual request of R
vi ) returns a random number that has higher probability to be close or equal to U 
vi , ensures that the probability of selecting a priority for a request U k vi is proportional to U vi and is higher than the probability of selecting other values for U j,k vi . This is done by means of a random selection from a truncated normal distribution [16] with range 0 to 1. The truncated version of the normal distribution is used to constrain the values of the distribution to the range of priority values desired from 0 to 1. The resulting probability density function (PDF) of the truncated normal distribution of a random variable x is given by:
with mean at µ = U vi , s is the standard deviation of the normal distribution that controls how dispersed or concentrated the U
vi , a and b are the lower and upper bounds of the truncation, and φ and Φ are the PDF and CDF for the standard normal distribution respectively. For reference the PDF and CDF of a normal random variable x is given by: ) and
where erf is the error function. 
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close to each other, consequently they could be linked to an ESU. On the other hand, large values of s result in dispersed U 2) Submitting Charging Requests to the aggreagtor: After v i computes the requests' SoC and TCC, it should use the anonymous tokens previously acquired from the CC to 
vi and CC signature on it as described in Section. IV-B. Also, the request includes S 
D. Charging Request's Aggregation and Verification
When the charging requests reach the aggregator (and later the CC), they need to be verified for authenticity and integrity. As the number of ESUs in individual communities increases, the number of requests also increases, and thus more computation is needed for verifying each request signature. What makes the problem worse is that each ESU sends multiple requests. To avoid causing congestions and delays in the communication, an efficient and secure approach to aggregate and validate these requests' signatures is needed, both at the aggregator and the CC level.
The aggregator receives requests of multiple ESUs in the community during any given time slot and proceeds to aggregate the signatures, similar to the approach presented in [17] . The foundation of this signature aggregation and verification are performed in the following manner.
1) ESUx sends a signature in each request that takes the general form of
2) The aggregator performs signature aggregation of all n signatures as follows
For verification of the aggregated signature, if the equality below holds true:
After the aggregator performs signature verification and aggregation, it then sends the requests to the CC for scheduling the charging requests.
E. Computing the Charging Schedules
In this phase the CC receives the charging requests and their aggregated signatures, he/she validates the following. (i) Verifies the received time-stamps. (ii) Verify the aggregated signature. (iii) Finally, each token that is used by an ESU should be included in CC table and to ensure that the token has not been used before i.e., check the expiration date of the token, the CC checks the table containing the hash of the used token. If an individual token is expired or reused, then the request associated with this token is denied. Alternatively, if these verifications succeed, the CC then proceeds with computing the charge schedule for the requests using their values of SoC and TCC as follows.
Each community is connected to an electric bus with a loading limit of C. At a given time slot, the regular load capacity is given by P R . Thus, the accessible charging limit with respect to the ESUs at a given time slot is given by C − P R . Due to the limited capacity (C − P R ), it is possible that not all ESUs with charging requests can charge at the present time slot. Rather, our scheme calculates a priority for each ESU and the ESUs with high priority should charge at the present time slot, while other ESUs' charging requests can be postponed to future time slots.
CC will use to run Knapsack algorithm for the scheduling of charging each request as in [1] .
After the CC finishes the scheduling using Knapsack, it sends the response packet back to the ESUs via the aggregator. The response packet takes the form of CRes, ID
. The one-time identity ID (i)
x generated by the originating ESUx, and the charging schedule [CS (i) x ] encrypted using the symmetric key K
cx is encrypted by the public key of the CC, only the controller can obtain the K (i) cx that is used to encrypt the CC's response to the individual ESU. After the response packets are received by the aggregator, it should broadcast them to its community of ESUs, as shown in Fig. 3 . Each ESU receiving the broadcast proceeds to decrypt its charging schedules of its requests for the current time slot using K V. PROPOSED DECENTRALIZED SCHEME In this section, we discuss in details, our proposed decentralized charging coordination scheme. The scheme is tailored for to be used in developing communities where there is no reliable, resilient, and secure communication infrastructure to accommodate the communication requirements between the aggregator and CC.
A. Overview
The scheme is run in a fully distributed way where several ESUs should run the scheme to collect the total amount of power that can be injected by some ESUs and in the same time coordinate charging. To do that, one ESU is selected as a head node ESU H . The head node should decrypt the ciphertext of the aggregated messages of the ESUs' messages and broadcast the aggregated message to the community but without being able to access the ESUs' individual messages to preserve privacy. The scheme is described in details in four phases: initialization, charging requests submission, verification and aggregation of charging requests, and charging schedule computation.
B. System Initialization
During the initialization phase, each ESU i should generate a public/private key pair x i and Y i , where the private key x i R ← Z * q , the public key is Y i = x i P , q is a large prime number, and P is the generator of a cyclic additive group G A . Then, the ESUs show their public key to a certificate authority to receive a certificate Cert i . The certificate and public/private key pair are used to authenticate ESUs. Each ESU, acting as a head node should generate public/private key pairs for homomorphic encryption scheme, and broadcast the public key. The public key to used to encrypt ESU's charging demand, while the private key to used by the head end to compute the aggregated charging demand.
C. Charging Request Format
The charging request message is divided into two portions where the first portion is dedicated to ESUs reporting injected power into the electric grid, and the second portion is dedicated to ESUs needing power from the grid for their charging. The second portion is divided by priority levels, as illustrated in Fig. 5 . Each ESU should calculate its priority using Eq. 2 in Sec. IV, and the priority range [0, 1] is divided into levels, (e.g., P 1 ∈ [0,0.1), P 2 ∈ [0.1,0.2), ..., and P 10 ∈ [0.9,1]), and each priority level has a set of associated bits used to report the amount of charging each ESU needs. If ESU's priority is on level 3 and it needs to charge 50kW, it has to write its charging need in the set corresponding to its charging priority level and write zeros in the other sets , as shown in Fig. 5 .
By aggregating all the messages of all the ESUs of a community, the set of bits corresponding to level i, gives the total power needed by all the ESUs in the community that have priority level i, where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 10}.
D. Charging Request Submission
In this phase, each ESU should mask its demand by using a secret mask, encrypt the masked demands using and the homomorphic encryption, and send the ciphertext to the ESU H .
In case of one hop communication, the ESU H receives the encryption of the masked demand of an ESU, but it cannot decrypt the ciphertext without knowing the mask. The idea is that the secret masks are shared with other ESUs, called proxy ESUs, that should use masks in their ciphertext so that all masks are cancelled by aggregating all charging demands and the ESU H can decrypt the resultant ciphertext to know the total demand of the community.
Each ESU x should encrypt its charging demands as follows:
where s x = s x,1 + · · · + s x,k , where s x,i is a shared secret mask between ESU x and its proxy ESU i . Each proxy ESU i should substract the secret mask from n in its message. For example the ciphertext of proxy ESU 1 is:
By this way, after aggregating all readings:
n and when this message is decrypted the
For simplicity, it is assumed that a mask is added by one ESU and deleted by others but for additional security each ESU should add a mask that is shared with multiple ESUs.
The purpose of adding a mask by ESU x and removing it by other proxy ESUs' messages is to:
• Prevent ESU H from knowing the demand of one ESU because given E(m x ) = g mx r n+sx ESU H cannot use its private key to decrypt the message because the exponent of r should be n, but given E(m) = g mx+ n i=1 mi (r k ) n , ESU H can decrypt this message using its private key. Note that r k or r does not make a difference in the decryption because both are random numbers. Additionally, r is known to all ESUs, e.g., r = H(date) where H is a hash function and date is the current date.
• Protect against collusion attack. In order to get the charging demand of ESU x , ESU H has to collude with all the proxy ESUs to obtain s x,i for i = {1, 2, ..., k} to compute s x and then compute m x as follows:
and then it decrypts this message to get m x . The charging request packet ESU x should send to the head node is ID x , E(m x ), T S, σ x , where σ x is the signature on the message in the form of σ x = xH(ID x , E(m x ), T S) where T S is the timestamp and x is the private key of ESU x. This signature is used to ensure integrity and authenticity of the packets.
E. Verification and Aggregation of Charging Requests's Signatures
In this phase, the head node learn the total demand of the whole community without knowing the individual demands of the ESUs. Signatures are aggregated as follows: σ agg = n i=1 σ i , and homomorphic ciphertexts are aggregated as follows: E(
As the number of ESUs in the community increases, the computations and verification process can consume considerable time. In order to reduce the time required for this verification step, aggregated signature is used where verification can take place in one single verification step. The aggregated signatures are considered valid if e(P ,
, where σ i is the signature of each ESU i , Y i is the public key of the ESU sending encrypted request R i , and T S is the timestamp.
The proof for the validity is given as follows:
To get the aggregated demand of all charging requests, the homomorphic ciphertexts should be multiplied using the Paillier additive homomorphic property.
After aggregating the demands of all the ESUs in a community, ESU H can compute the aggregated requests by performing E(m agg )=g
, ESU H should use its private key to decrypt the ciphertext and obtain k i=1 m i , which is the total charging demand of the community of ESUs.
To simplify our explanation, it is assumed that there is only one head node, but the scheme can easily be extended to have multiple head nodes if one head node is not trusted in reporting the total demand correctly. In this case, aggregation can be done by more than one head node and the total demand can be broadcasted by the head nodes. The head nodes should continuously change to distribute the overhead of decrypting the aggregated message on the community nodes.
F. Charging Schedule Computation
After ESU H computes the aggregated charging demand, it then verifies whether this aggregated demand exceeds the charging capacity C, which is computed by adding the injected capacity by aggregating all the sets corresponding to power injection. If the total charging demand is less than or equal to C, then all requests are granted since there is enough energy to service the demands of all the ESUs. This is communicated via a broadcast message from ESU H to all the ESUs. On the other hand, if the charging demand exceeds the charging capacity, then the high priority ESUs should charge without exceeding the charging capacity. To do that the next phase should be run.
To compute the charging schedules, the head node should broadcast the aggregated message to all the community ESUs and then using this message each ESU can know whether it can charge or not, and the amount of power it can charge without exceeding the total charging capacity. This is done as follows.
Each ESU compares the maximum charging capacity C to the total charging demand of a number of sets, from the highest priority set to the lowest priority set, until it finds the first sets where their total demand is greater than or equal to the maximum charging capacity, e.g., from the highest priority set to set number L. If the total charge capacity C is equal to the total charging demand of these sets, then all the ESUs that have at least priority L can charge. If the power demand of all the sets from the highest priority to priority level L is greater than the total charging capacity, then all the ESUs that have priority at least L+1 should charge and for full utilization of the available charging power capacity, the remaining power (∆) is charged by the ESUs of priority level L as follows:
The power ESU x should charge is given by:
where
is the total charging needed by the ESUs with priority level L, and ∆ is given by Where L max as the maximum priority level and L+1 the lowest priority level that guarantees the condition
To illustrate the idea, a numerical example is presented using ten ESUs and a community capacity C of 300kW. The varying power demands and priorities for each ESU were selected arbitrarily as given in Table II . And the corresponding charging requests for all ESUs according are given in III ESU H can compute the total charging demand by each priority level. This demand is reported in III in the E t line which is broadcasted to the community of ESUs, along with the capacity C. After receiving this message, each ESU finds the priority level L that exceeds the community capacity C, and determine whether they can charge or if they need to reduce their charging demands by using Equation V-F.
In the example, L is level 4, since The results of the charging computation are presented in III, where the second column gives the charging request of each ESU, and the third column gives the charging schedule Schedule (E xf ) 1  10  10  2  30  27  3  50  50  4  60  0  5  90  90  6  20  0  7  5  0  8  40  40  9  20  20  10 70 63
Total 395 300
including the amount of power each ESU can charge.
VI. CHARGING COORDINATION PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate charging coordination for both schemes and compare them to the FCFS scheme in terms of the usage of available energy resources.
A. Evaluation of the Centralized Scheme
This experiment studies the percentage of ESUs leaving without full charge considering two different scenarios in the centralized scheme: First Come First Serve (FCFS) with ESUs allowed a single request per time slot, and our centralized scheme with three requests per time slot allowed per ESU.
Experiment Setup. The simulation parameters were set as follows. The community capacity C was set to 1000kW, with the number of ESUs ranged from 1 to 45 with increments of one in every run. The maximum energy demand per ESU was set to 100kW, with the SoC and TCC of the ESUs assigned randomly using uniform distribution. Each run was conducted over a period of 30 time slots.
Experiment Results. Fig. 6a gives the number of ESUs that do not fully charge before TCC expires versus the number of ESUs. It can be seen that our scheme outperforms the FCFS scheme, and this performance improvement is noticeably more significant when the number of ESUs increases. With the parameters used, the improvement starts when the number of ESUs is 20. This is attributed to the fact that unlike FCFS scheme, our scheme prioritizes the requests and charge the high priority requests before they expire.
B. Evaluation of the Decentralized Scheme
In order to assess the charging coordination performance of the distributed scheme, an experiment was setup in order to compare it to the first-come-first-serve scheme. The performance metric used is the number of ESUs with charging requests that expire without fully charging. Experiments's Results. Fig. 6b gives the number of ESUs that were not able to charge before their charging request expired. It can be observed that the proposed decentralized scheme outperforms FCFS, by allowing a greater number of ESUs to charge with the available energy resources. A noticeable increase in the number of ESUs without full charge is observed when 20 ESUs compete for the available allocated community capacity. The number of ESUs leaving without full charge in FCFS is greater than that of the proposed scheme because unlike our scheme that uses priority to select the ESUs that should charge first, FCFS charges based on the time of arrival of the ESU's request. Additionally, with larger increments of the number of ESUs, the performance gap widens considerably between the two schemes.
VII. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section we evaluate and analyze security and privacy of our schemes.
A. Centralized Scheme Analysis 1) Resist to Linkabilty attacks: By submitting multiple requests with random SoC and TCC instead of only one, it is hard for the CC to link requests sent from the same ESU using SoC and TCC. However, since the priorities of requests of ESUx are proportional to the ESUx priority (P x ) the CC could use this information to attempt linkability attacks on charging requests. However, due to the probabilistic nature of priorities of the charging requests, the priorities of the charging requests of different ESUs may overlap which can confuse the CC and make the linkability difficult. In order to evaluate quantitatively the linkability attack, we ran an experiment and the results are presented in the next section. We consider two cases for linking requests using SoC/TCC and the priorities of the requests.
In order to assess our scheme under various linkability attack scenarios, several experiments were conducted. The first experiment studied the probability of success of performing a linkability attack using distance-based Attack 3, that uses both SoC and TCC with and without our scheme. The reason for selecting Attack 3 is that it gave the best result as explained earlier. The second experiment studied the likelihood of linkability attacks using distance-based technique using priorities with and without our scheme. Finally, to study the linkability of the requests using their priorities in a second way, a transition probability matrix for transitions of priority values was created. The transition matrix is a table of probabilities of transitioning an ESU's request priority from time slot t − 1 to time slot t, where the rows represent the priorities at the time t − 1 and the columns are priorities at time t, and states represent the different values that priorities can have. For instance, if in time slot t − 1 for ESUx, a given request has a priority value of 0.7, and it transitions to a state of priority of 0.5 in time slot t, then in the transition probability matrix, the element in row i associated with 0.7, and column j associated with 0.5, would show the probability of transition from state 0.7 to 0.5 from time slot t − 1 to time slot t.
The transition probability p i,j is defined as the transition probability of transitioning from state i to state j, and p i,i is the probability of transitioning to the same state. Thus, the state transition probability matrix T P i,j can be written as: : Evaluation of probability of success in linkability attack. Additionally, since the transition should always land in a given state, the sum of all entries in any given row of T P is equal to one [18] .
In order to launch a charging request linkability attack, the transition probability matrix T P can be used to find the most likely priority i observed in time t − 1 and link it to the priority j observed at time t.
Experiments Setup. The experiments were performed using Matlab with the following parameters. The number of ESUs were incremented from 1 to 150, the community charging capacity was set at 1000kW, and for SoC, a maximum of 100kW per request was used with three requests per ESUs, the TCC range was set to {1, · · · , 48} and a total of 30 time slots. The values of α1 and α2 were selected as 0.9 and 0.1 respectively.
Experiment Results. The plot of the first experiment shown in 7a demonstrates the effectiveness of our scheme in the reduction of the probability of a linkability attack. The likelihood of successful linkability attack becomes very close to zero with 20 ESUs, as opposed to being close to one even with 80 ESUs.
In 7b, the plot demonstrates that with the current parameter values, linkability attacks based on priority alone provide low success probability compared to those using SoC and TCC. This is attributed to the use of a short range and low resolution values of priorities, and the use of a priority function that transforms the SoC and TCC values using a non-linear function resulting in priority values in consecutive time slots for the same ESU that could be close to each other, however, the assumption that there should be a minimum distance between priorities of requests of consecutive time slots, as used in the SOC and TCC linkability attack, no longer holds. Attackers would benefit from higher resolutions of priority values as this allows priority of requests to become more spread from each other, as opposed to being close due to low resolution and harder to identify as potential link candidates. Our scheme uses several requests with random values of SoC and TCC to avoid linking attacks with SoC and TCC as shown previously, however these requests have similar priorities, which justifies the similar performances of both schemes using priority.
From the results of the last experiment, shown in 7c, it can be observed that the probability of success of the likability attack using the transition matrix is high without our scheme. However, in our scheme the success of linkability attacks using the transition matrix approach is reduced. This is attributed to the variations of priority among the charging requests per ESU that tend to lower the probability of the most likely priority transition among requests in two consecutive time slots. As expected, there is a tendency for the probability to decrease as the number of ESUs increases. This is due to the fact that with a larger number of ESUs, the chances of finding requests with similar priority transitions increases, and consequently, distinguishing from requests between time slots based on priority becomes more difficult. As a general observation, the greater the number of ESUs, the lower the probability of success of linkability attacks becomes.
2) The centralized scheme meets the following security/privacy features.: 1) Achieves data authentication. All the messages in our scheme are authenticated to ensure that those messages are sent by legitimate ESUs. This authentication is done in our scheme by using signatures. In section 5.2.4, each ESU obtains anonymous tokens signed by the CC. The CC verifies the signature once a token is used along with a charging request. This signature on the anonymous token guarantees that the request is sent by a legitimate ESU member of a community, as only legitimate ESUs in this community could obtain valid tokens from the CC because the ESU should sign to obtain tokens. 2) Resist to replay attacks and token validity and reuse:
In order to prevent replay attacks, all the messages in our scheme have a signed fresh timestamp. Although anonymous tokens are received in advance of when the charging request is actually sent they have a time to expire which limits the usability of the token to within this expiry time T E. The CC also keeps track of the used tokens by storing their hash values. In this manner, reused tokens can be identified by the CC. 3) Achieves confidentiality of SoC and TCC. In our scheme, the SoC and TCC are encrypted with an encryption key K
cx that is only known to the CC and the ESU sending the charging request. The key K (i) cx is encrypted by the public key of the CC (P K cc ) and the ciphertext is sent to the CC. This ensures that only the CC can decrypt the ciphertext and obtain K (i) cx and use it when communicating the charging schedule back to ESUx. 4) Resist to collusion resistance. By using PBS during the acquisition of anonymous tokens, each ESU can anonymously send its charging requests without the need to reveal its real identity. By using one-time generated IDs that are not linkable to an ESU, the privacy of the ESUs is preserved.
B. Decentralized Scheme Analysis
• Achieves privacy and collusion resistance. If m ESUs are considered malicious nodes colluding with the head node from a total of n ESUs in the community, with m > λ, and λ is the number of proxy ESUs, the probability of ESU H colluding with all λ ESUs out of a total of n ESUs, follows a hypergeometric distribution. The probability distribution function (PDF) of the hypergeometric probability distribution is given by:
where x is the number of malicious ESUs included in the selection of λ ESUs out of n ESUs. This probability distribution corresponds to the number of successful selections of λ proxies among m malicious ESUs, using samples of size λ without replacements, meaning that a different set of λ proxies is used during every new sample. The probability of the ESU H colluding with all λ proxy nodes is plotted in Figure 8 based on various values of m and λ, where the number of ESUs in the network is n = 300. From the Fig., it can be observed that when an ESU selects λ = 4 proxies, roughly 1% out of the total number of ESUs in the community, and the number of malicious ESUs is m = 100, or 30% of the total n ESUs, the probability of revealing a charging demand of an ESU by ESU H is 0.07 for the case of selecting 8 proxy ESUs, the probability of revealing a charging demand of an ESU drops to 0.01. As the number of proxies increases, it becomes more difficult for ESU H to recover a the charging demands of the ESUs. Note that if the number of proxies selected is λ = 16, the probability of recovering a charging demand by ESU H becomes zero. This is under the assumption that there are already 100 malicious nodes colluding with ESU H , which in reality is a very large number. If the number of malicious ESUs is increased to 200, or 66% of the total ESUs in the community, then the probability of revealing a charging request data by the ESU H becomes one. If further security and privacy is needed, then the number of proxy ESUs should be increased, targetting a higher ratio of proxy ESUs to the total n ESUs.
• Achieves data anonymity. Our decentralized scheme aims to prevent any ESU from knowing the charging demands of other ESUs. In order to accomplish this, aggregation and secret masks addition were used. By using aggregation, only the total charging demand of a number of ESUs can be known. By using secret masks to mask the ESUs' messages, the head node that knows the private key of the homomorphic encryption scheme has to collude with a number of ESUs (proxy ESUs) to decrypt the message, using the mask shared with the proxy ESUs, as follows r −sx E(m x )=g mx r n and this can be decrypted using the private key of the head node where s x = K i=1 s xi and K is the number of proxies and E(m x )=g mx r n+sx . The idea is that by using enough number of proxy ESUs, the attack can be infeasable because the head ESU has to collude with an unrealistic number of proxy ESUs.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Various schemes have been proposed to secure and preserve privacy in different wireless networks and applications, such as [19] - [22] , but these schemes cannot be used to solve the problems addressed in this paper because they are designed for different network and threat models.
Numerous privacy-preservation schemes are proposed in literature for different smart grid applications such as Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) [23] - [25] and power injection [10] , [26] . AMI is a communications network that enables twoway communication between utilities and customers. Smart meters send fine-grained power consumption data in realtime, e.g., every few seconds. In [23] , the authors used a data obfuscation mechanism and proposed secure and efficient algorithms to distribute obfuscation values within an AMI network. They presented a protocol that utilizes LTE cellular network for exchanging of data among various gateways. An efficient privacy-preserving data collection scheme for smart grid AMI networks is proposed in [25] . By using a lightweight symmetric-key-cryptography and hashing operations, the proposed scheme can collect the consumption data while preserving the customer privacy. The authors use the asymmetric key cryptography operations for key management that is executed every long time. In [10] , Akula et al. proposed a privacy-preserving scheme for power injection in smart grid that is based on the idea of aggregation of sensitive information of the storage units' owners to prevent the utility from knowing individual's sensitive information. The proposed scheme can be used for the authentication of the storage units and the integrity of their data. Mahmoud et al. proposed a novel secure and privacy-preserving power injection querying scheme over AMI and LTE cellular networks in [26] . The proposed scheme is based on two aggregation techniques to hide the storage units' sensitive information. They also developed a bilinear pairing based technique to enable the utility company to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the aggregated bid without accessing the individual bids coming from the storage units.
In [27] , a decentralized charging coordination has been proposed based on the blockchain to enable a transparent, reliable charging coordination among ESUs. However, while blockchain can reduce the reliance on intermediaries [28] , the scheme can not be used where there is no reliable communication like developing countries.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper. we proposed two privacy-preserving and collusion-resistant charging coordination schemes for Smart grid. In the centralized scheme, collusion is mitigated by using partial blinded signatures form the CC. In the centralized scheme, to mitigate collusion between the CC and the aggreagtor, each energy storage unit (ESU) should acquire anonymous tokens from the CC to send multiple charging requests to the CC via the aggregator. CC can use the charging requests to enough data to run the charging coordination scheme, but but it cannot link the data to particular ESUs or reveal any private information. In the decentralized scheme, several ESUs run the scheme in a distributed way with no need to aggreagator or CC. One ESU is selected as a head node that should decrypt the ciphertext of the aggregated messages of the ESUs' messages and broadcast the aggregated message to the community but without being able to access the ESUs' individual messages to preserve privacy. Then, Each ESU can determine if she can charge or not while not exceeding the maximum charging capcity of the community. Extensive simulations are conducted and indicated that our schemes are efficient and secure against various attacks, and can preserve ESU owner's privacy.
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